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CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
OTIS H. KING*
Before one can discuss the contribution of any specific Justice of the
Warren Court to equal protection, he faces the difficult task of separat-
ing that individual's work from the whole. This is particularly true
with the Warren Court because it, possibly more than any other Court,
has come to bear the appellation of its Chief Justice. I believe, how-
ever, that as an individual, Chief Justice Earl Warren had a great im-
pact on shaping the expanded role the Court assumed during its sixteen
year tenure, and he especially influenced the two most significant deci-
sions of that Court, and perhaps of our time, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion' and Baker v. Carr.2
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren read to a packed and
expectant Courtroom the words that would ignite the torch in the final
assault on discrimination and segregation in this country, not only in
education, but in every facet of society that operated upon the public
functioning of the citizenry of this nation.' The rallying cry of the die-
hard, unreconstructed segregationist was that once blacks achieved in-
tegration in the schools, they would next want to marry their white
daughters. While their focus of the next black thrust was obviously
erroneous, these persons were eminently correct in perceiving that
school desegregation would not be the final goal, and that once this
objective were attained there would be assaults launched on all the re-
maining vestiges of racism until they, indeed, had been removed root
and branch.
Just as Sweatt v. Painter4 pointed inexorably toward Brown, those
* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University. B.S.,
Texas Southern University, 1956; LL.B., Texas Southern School of Law, 1961; Ford Fellow in
Clinical Education, Harvard School of Law, 1969; L.C.M., Harvard School of Law, 1970; City
Attorney for the City of Houston, 1976; Dean, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern
University, 1970-80.
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Sweaut was actually the last in a series of carefully planned cases in
which the NAACP chipped away at the underpinning of segregated education. The NAACP
deliberately chose to concentrate its efforts in the arena of higher education, primarily at the grad-
uate and professional level, because it correctly perceived that integration at these levels would be
met with less resistance than in the public schools. Swealt was the first case to reach the Supreme
Court where in the Court could deal squarely with the issue of whether a separate facility was
actually equal. In holding that the newly created black law school at Texas State University was
not the equivalent of that at the University of Texas, the Court cleared the way for a frontal
assault on all segregated education.
1
King: Chief Justice Earl Warren
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
who would stay the hand of progress toward full participation of blacks
in the public society and body politic of this country well knew that the
tide could not and would not be turned at the schoolhouse door. As
we now reflect upon what must have been in the mind of Earl Warren
in October 1953, as he prepared to assume the position of Chief Justice,
we must conclude that he approached his task fully cognizant that as
momentous as the striking down of segregation in the public schools
might be, it would be but a first step in the process of acquiring equality
for the black man.
Brown is significant for what it states and for what it does not state,
but equally significant, and perhaps even more important, is the role
played by Chief Justice Earl Warren in fashioning a decision that
would unite a divided Court so that the decision could be a unanimous
pronouncement of the Court.
Reading the final two paragraphs of the Court's decision, the Chief
Justice stated: "We conclude .. ."' At this point, Chief Justice War-
ren departed from the printed text before him to insert the word "unan-
imously."7 This pronouncement sent a sound of muffled astonishment
eddying around the Courtroom. He continued, "[Iln the field of public
education the doctrine of separate but equal has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."' In those simple but
dramatic words the Chief Justice was proclaiming to all that the plain-
tiffs in all the cases consolidated under the heading of Brown v. Board
of Education had been denied equal protection of the laws as guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment.9
More important than the written words of the text was the one in-
serted word "unanimously." There must have been much speculation
regarding the decision, and certainly there must have been a consider-
able amount of guessing by Court watchers as to how each Justice
would vote. But probably no one, other than the members of the
5. The provision of universal "free" public education is a uniquely American idea and is
rooted in the notion of our constitutional form of participatory democracy. Blacks have tradition-
ally viewed education as a means of achieving greater participation in the social, economic, and
political fabric of this society. I cannot but believe that whites who fought so vehemently against
integration also perceived that the disestablishment of segregated public schools would lead to a
further erosion of their control over the black populace in these other vital areas and, thus, their
opposition, although neatly cloaked in constitutional arguments about states rights, was generated
as much, if not more, by this concern.
6. 347 U.S. at 495.
7. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 707 (1976).
8. 347 U.S. at 495.
9. The companion cases included: Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (1952); Davis v.
County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (1952); Gebhart v. Belton, 33 D. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (1952).
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Court, was prepared to hear that the decision was a unanimous one.'
There were no concurring opinions, and most assuredly there was not
even one dissenting voice.
Much has been said and written about Brown and its progeny. The
internal drama which led to this unanimous decision and the important
role played by the Chief Justice is less well known. With the perfect
vision of hindsight it is rather easy to believe that a single decision
mandating immediate disestablishment of the segregated school sys-
tems was the better course. However, let us look at the man, Earl War-
ren, and his participation as Chief Justice in the development of that
unanimous decision and consider whether there was any other choice
realistically available to the Court, given the circumstances under
which that decision was fashioned and the political climate of the day.
First, let us look at the man Earl Warren before we consider him as
the Chief Justice. Earl Warren was born in Los Angeles in 1890." His
father, Matt, was a Norwegian immigrant who came to the United
States shortly after the Civil War.' 2 Earl Warren attended both under-
graduate school and law school at the University of California at
Berkeley. 13
In 1925, he became the district attorney for Alameda County where
he was a vigorous prosecutor, well respected by all. ' 4 He even stopped
drinking so that he could feel comfortable in his prosecution of boot-
leggers during the era of prohibition.' 5
As a result of his dedication, Earl Warren was elected Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of California' 6 thirteen years later in 1938. In this
capacity, he became one of the first to express the notion of a "yellow
peril" posed by the Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast.'
7
This is one of the ironies in the life of Chief Justice Earl Warren-a
man whose name would identify a Court that would be consid-
ered synonymous with civil liberties. That he was a strong supporter of
the effort to remove the Japanese is evidenced by his testimony before a
special California House Committee on the desirability and the wis-
dom of removing the Nisei from the West Coast and relocating them in
10. The importance of this unanimity cannot be overstated; those who were to desperately
oppose the implementation of the integration of the schools would clutch at the flimsiest of straws
in support of their position. Thus, even one dissenting opinion would have made the excruciat-
ingly difficult task ahead all the more difficult.
I1. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 659.
12. Id.




17. Id. at 661. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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detention camps.I8 He stated that "the Nisei had an 'entirely different'
cultural background from that of other Americans, including those of
German and Italian extraction, and [he] produced maps of the Califor-
nia coast showing that 'virtually every important strategic location and
installation' from Main County to the Mexico border had one or more
Japanese-American land owners in the immediate vicinity." 9 He con-
cluded his testimony by proclaiming, "It is a situation fraught with the
greatest danger and under no circumstances should it ever be permitted
to exist."2
The final irony in this situation lies in the fact that just two weeks
before the decision was issued in Brown, Chief Justice Warren wrote an
opinion in a case involving jury discrimination against Mexican-Amer-
icans.2' In this opinion, he stated that the fourteenth amendment
clearly provides protection to "any delineated class" and that those
protections are to be extended to any class that is singled out for dis-
crimination.22
Chief Justice Warren never really apologized for his role in the re-
moval of the Nisei from the West Coast and, perhaps, that indicates
another measure of the man. Although he considered the action regret-
able, even in his later years he viewed it as necessary, given the emo-
tional feelings against the Japanese. In defense of Chief Justice
Warren, it should be pointed out that President Roosevelt ordered that
the step be taken;23 Tom Clark was sent by the Justice Department to
oversee the relocation;24 and the Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 opinion
authored by Hugo Black (who was the foremost civil libertarian of that
Court), eventually sanctioned it as an emergency war measure.25
Notwithstanding all of that, it should not be overlooked that the reloca-
tion of the Japanese was more racially inspired than it was dictated by
any military expediency. Also, as late as June 1943, then Governor
Earl Warren was still supporting the removal of the Japanese.26 In a
18. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 661.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hernandes v. Texas, 347 U.S. 476 (1954).
22. Id. at 478. Obviously the Chief Justice recognized that although Texas had classified
Mexican-Americans as "white," they, nevertheless, were capable (primarily by surnames) of being
singled out as a delineated class. It was this singling out for special treatment that constituted a
denial of equal protection. In Hernandes, it was held that the state had denied equal protection to
citizens of Mexican ancestry by systematically excluding them from juries. Perhaps Chief Justice
Warren chose this case, just as he was to later choose Baker Y. Carr as a vehicle to exorcise one of
the demons of his political past. For a discussion of his involvement with Baker v. Carr, see text
accompanying notes 64-65, 68-70 infra.
23. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 662.
24. Id.
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 662.
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meeting of governors held that year in Ohio, he stated: "We don't pro-
pose to have the Japs back in California during this war if there is any
lawful means of preventing it."27 Again to his credit, however, during
the closing months of the war when the Nisei were permitted to return
to the coast, Governor Warren convened emergency meetings of state
officials to insure that the Japanese-Americans would be allowed to re-
settle peaceably and would be given the "full protection of the law."28
He was not, however, to express regrets over his participation in this
relocation effort until his autobiography more than thirty years later.
29
These events are pointed out not to disparage the man, but to indi-
cate that his had not been the type of history that would have indicated
the kind of Chief Justice he was to become or the kind of liberal record
his Court was to establish. In fact, had his record not indicated that he
would follow a conservative judicial philosophy, the man accused of
having presided over the most activist Court in our history quite proba-
bly would never have been selected.3 °
Perhaps the greatest contribution that President Dwight Eisenhower
made to the civil rights movement in this country was the appointment
of Earl Warren to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
on October 5, 1953."' In the spring of 1952, the Pittsburgh Courier in-
terviewed Dwight Eisenhower and Earl Warren, both candidates for
the presidential nomination, concerning their respective positions on
civil rights matters.32 General Eisenhower was noncommittal and
showed a complete lack of knowledge of the legislation necessary to
deal with the area.33 On the other hand, Earl Warren made his posi-
tion completely clear when he stated, "I am for sweeping civil rights
programs, beginning with a fair employment practices act ... . I in-
sist upon one law for all men."' 34 Thus, the final irony in the selection
and elevation of Governor Earl Warren to the position of Chief Justice
of the highest court lay in the fact that he was chosen by a president
whose record on civil rights was virtually nonexistent and who later
was to comment that Chief Justice Warren's selection was possibly his
single greatest mistake during his presidency.35
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN (1977).
30. It is something of a sad indictment of our political system that often persons who are later
to perform magnificently have to live with unprincipled decisions they had to make in order to
survive as popular public figures.




35. Id. Perhaps Eisenhower was unaware of the remarks made by candidate Warren. If so,
perhaps he chose to accept them as campaign rhetoric and elected to rely on his overall record
rather than his recent pronouncements as a predictor of what kind of Chief Justice he would
5
King: Chief Justice Earl Warren
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
Everyone connected with Brown must have been anxiously awaiting
the naming of the new Chief Justice. All were probably aware that the
Court was divided on how to deal with the issues presented during the
first argument.36 Although Chief Justice Warren had never served as a
judge prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court, he nevertheless took
with him a wealth of experience that had developed in him a sense of
supreme self-confidence. His ability to organize the Court into a sin-
gle-minded approach was an accomplishment of no little moment. Al-
though he will probably never be accorded the accolades of having
been a great legal scholar, his judicial philosophy and his thorough
preparation and knowledge of the Court insured that his position in
history will be along side other great luminaries who have served upon
the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Warren took a very pragmatic view regarding the func-
tion of the Court.37 What appealed to him most about serving on the
Court was that he "understood the Supreme Court to serve a function
beyond the letters of the law, and it was that higher purpose-as ulti-
mate framer of just solutions to profound disputes-that most appealed
to him."3 It was precisely this attitude that he used in fashioning a
decision in Brown that could be agreed to by all.
Brown had been set for reargument on December 7, 1953, and on
that day the line started to form early outside the Court. "At one
o'clock in the morning . . . a seventy-six-year-old black man named
Arthur J. Smith took his place proudly outside the front door of the
Supreme Court. He was the first in line."39 Shortly after daybreak, he
was joined by the Reverend J. A. Delaine of Lake City, South Caro-
lina, who was the organizer of Griggs v. Elliott,' one of the four cases
consolidated under the heading of Brown v. Board of Education.4'
During reargument, the Chief Justice gave little indication of his po-
sition.42 He asked no substantive questions and said very little.43 The
Justices' first conference on the case convened on Saturday morning,
December 12.14 It is clear that by the time of the conference, the Chief
Justice had decided upon what he perceived to be the only conclusion
become. It is great irony that Warren, the consummate liberal, was forced to make harsh and
repressive choices as a politician and that it was this record that made him acceptable to the
conservative Eisenhower.
36. Id. at 666.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 667.
40. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See note 9 supra.
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that the Supreme Court could reach regarding segregated schools. 5
According to the notes taken by Justice Burton, Chief Justice Warren
made it very clear to the other members of the Court that he did not see
how Plessy v. Ferguson46 could be sustained on any theory other than
one expressing a belief that members of the Negro race were inferior to
those of the white race.4' Although the Chief Justice expressed the
view that there was no alternative under the three civil war amend-
ments but to reach the decision that segregated schools had to be dises-
tablished, he nevertheless expressed the sentiment that it would be
unwise to engage in precipitous action that would inflame the situation
more than necessary.48
The Chief Justice knew that a year earlier four of the Justices-
Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton-had indicated a willingness to
overturn segregation. 49 Adding his vote to theirs, he knew that there
was a majority of the Justices who would vote to overturn the segre-
gated school systems in the South." However, because he felt that a
narrow majority would not serve the best interests of those involved in
the case, he postponed the vote at that particular conference.5 ' The
Chief Justice was quite concerned about the impact and effect that a
narrow majority opinion would have on this country. 2 He certainly
must have feared that such a decision would only encourage those per-
sons in the South who were violently opposed to any integration. Ad-
ditionally, he felt that it would be equally disastrous to have even
concurring opinions, and he had a special abhorence to the possibility
of any dissenting votes.5 3
After the Chief Justice distributed his draft opinion to the other Jus-
tices, he called for a vote. 4 According to Justice Burton's diary, on
May 8 the Chief Justice won enthusiastic approval. Justice Burton re-
corded: "He has done, I believe, a magnificent job that may win a
unanimous Court. .. -"I It seems quite probable that the carefully
crafted draft had also won over Justice Clark. Although Justices
Frankfurter, Clark, and some of the others had only minor suggestions
on revising the draft, there was still the task of satisfying Justice Jack-
45. Id.
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).




51. Id. at 683.
52. Id.
53. Id. The Chief Justice was not alone in his desire to unify the Court. From the beginning,
Justice Felix Frankfurter had been working for a unified Court. Id. at 696.
54. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 694.
55. Id. at 696.
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son and winning over the would-be-dissenter, Justice Reed.56 The
Chief Justice personally took on the task of convincing Justice Reed of
the wisdom of joining in the opinion.17 He put the issue to him
squarely by informing him that he now stood alone and that he must
decide what was really the best thing for the country. 8 Justice Reed no
doubt realized, being a southerner, just what effect his lone dissent
would have on giving hope to those who were sworn to continued resis-
tence. Apparently, Justice Reed did extract one condition from the
Chief Justice for his vote, and that was a pledge that the implementa-
tion decree would allow for a gradual dismantling of the segregated
school system. 9
Justice Burton was to further note in his diary that "it looks like a
unanimous opinion. A major accomplishment for his leadership.
6°
He further noted that "the man from California had won the support of
every member of the Court."''1 Thus, Brown v. Board of Education was
decided. The case was to return, however, and the Court was again to
issue a unanimous decision.62
While it is inevitable that debates over the propriety of these deci-
sions will long continue among those who like to play the game of
"what if' with great historical events, it must be accepted that the no-
tion of equal protection gained added strength and renewed vigor as a
result of these decisions. The magnificent role played by the "Super
Chief' in hammering out this unanimous decision must also be ac-
knowledged. Given the resistance and violence triggered by the Brown
decision, it is not difficult to imagine how much greater it would have
been had it not been for the unanimous opinion, and for that we must
be eternally grateful to Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Interestingly enough, after leaving the Court, Chief Justice Warren
was to reflect his belief that Baker v. Carr63 and its progeny were more
important than the monumental decision in Brown: "The reason I am
of the opinion that Baker v. Carr is so important is because I believe so
devoutly that, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln's famous epigram, ours
is a government of all the people, by all the people, and for all the
people."'  In Reynolds v. Sims6 5 he stated it this way:
56. Id. at 698.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. This concession no doubt led to the inclusion of the term "all deliberate speed" in the
final order. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
60. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 698.
61. Id.
62. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
63. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
64. E. WARREN, supra note 29, at 308.
65. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8
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The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the es-
sence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at
the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can
be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise.
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as
ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are
those instruments of government elected directly by and directly repre-
sentative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and
unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system."66
Chief Justice Warren's position that the Supreme Court was to serve
as the "ultimate framer of just solutions to profound disputes" 67 was
certainly evident in the Court's approach to the reapportionment cases.
The first decision was Baker v. Carr,68 where the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws gave
each citizen a right to equal representation in a state legislature and
that this right of representation was enforceable by the federal judici-
ary. Thus, Baker v. Carr raised the eternal issue of the proper role of
the Supreme Court in our system of government.
Regardless of the extent of malapportionment of various districts
within the political system, many legal scholars argue that the Supreme
Court has no basis for exerting jurisdiction in this area and that the
only solution a political one.69 Many of the political systems and the
methods of electing representatives to various state legislatures had
been in existence since colonial times and thus, perhaps, the reasons for
their erection had been lost in the antiquity of their historical justifica-
tion. Nevertheless, many scholars argue that because of the traditional
notions of separation of powers, the Supreme Court should not assert
jurisdiction.70 While this position might have some basis in the strict
sense of the Court's jurisdiction, it clearly overlooks the practical
problems of effectuating a change throughout the same political
processes and political powers that had become entrenched in the very
system needing change. Professor Archibald Cox states, "A Counsel of
Wise Men, charged with doing whatever is good, or just, or wise, would
have found no difficulty in voiding the apportionment of the Tennessee
66. Id. at 555, 562.
67. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 666.
68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
69. For example, in his dissenting opinion in Baker, Justice Frankfurter advanced just this
rationale. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1961).
9
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legislature which was at issue in Baker v. Carr."' He further points
out that it would be impossible to defend these gross inequities as a
matter of sound government or abstract justice.72 In fact, Justice
Frankfurter was to place this specific issue in sharp focus in his dissent-
ing opinion in Baker v. Carr: "The Court's authority-possessed of
neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by
the Court's complete detachment. . . from political entanglements and
by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in
political settlements."73
Chief Justice Warren took the position that it was the role of the
Supreme Court to fashion a remedy in this "political" area.74 He felt a
special need of personal involvement in these cases.75 He could not
simply join in the opinion of other Justices because of the political
stand that he had taken when he was Governor of California.76 As a
matter of political expediency, he had opposed the redistricting of the
state along more equitable lines, and thus he had participated in con-
tinuing the malapportionment there.77 In his memoirs he stated: "I
wrote the opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. It held that our form of govern-
ment required fair representation; that fair representation meant equal
representation in which one man's vote had the same value as every
other, and that legislatures not elected on that basis were unconstitu-
tionally organized."78 The degree of controversy created by Reynolds
is evidenced by the fact that the Council of State Government went so
far as to propose a constitutional amendment that would negate the
decision.79 The decision also added fuel to the fires of the movement to
impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren. 0
The impact of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims has been tremen-
dous. Much of the progress made by blacks and other minorities to-
ward gaining elective and appointive offices has been a direct result of
those decisions. Although no black had served in the Texas legislature
since Reconstruction, two blacks were elected in 1966 as a result of
redistricting.8 ' One of those was Barbara Jordan, who was elected to
the state senate. As a result of further redistricting of the congressional
71. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 115 (1968).
72. Id.
73. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962).
74. E. WARREN, supra note 29, at 310.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 309-10.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 310.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 303-06.
81. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 726 n.17 (1972).
10
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district, she was elected to the United States Congress in 1972.82 The
overall impact of the redistricting that was mandated by Baker v. Carr
and Reynolds v. Sims can be measured by the fact that at the present
time there are more than 3,500 blacks serving in various state legisla-
tures and in other local elective positions.83 The number of blacks
serving in Congress has increased from five to seventeen.84 One could
argue that the redistricting has indirectly, if not directly, led to an in-
creased number of blacks and other minorities in appointed positions,
including judgeships at both the state and federal levels.
Once the district boundary lines were changed and minorities were
elected to legislative offices, it logically followed that they would have a
dramatic effect upon the overall political process. It is also obvious,
however, that the judiciary, while often ahead of the legislative bodies
in recognizing the need for social change through law, is not the most
effective agency to bring about that change. The hard fought battles
and hard won victories in the judicial arena have all too often been
diluted, if not totally avoided, by dilatory tactics." Additionally, the
time and effort that has been expended to effectuate even the most min-
ute change through the judicial process is often totally outstripped by
one piece of legislation.86 The involvement of blacks and other minori-
ties in the deliberative process in the legislative councils has undoubt-
ably made a substantial difference in the laws that now govern people
in the South and throughout this nation.
It is clear that the torch of liberty for blacks was lit by Brown, and it
is also clear that once that torch was lit it was inevitable that it would
light the way to victories in areas other than school desegregation.
Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why Chief Justice Warren
would cite Baker v. Carr and not Brown as the most significant decision
of the Supreme Court during the time that he served as Chief Justice.
It would be patently inaccurate to state that the gains of blacks in
elective and appointive offices were made possible simply on the basis
of the "one man-one vote" decisions. The enactment and implementa-
tion of the Voting Rights Act8" was a necessary part. It is, I believe,
82. Fleming, The Black Role in American Politics- Part I, The Present, in THE BLACK AMERI-
CAN REFERENCE BOOK 580 (1976).
83. JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, 9 NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFI-
CIALS X & XI (1979).
84. Id.
85. This is illustrated by the necessity of an implementation decision after Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Without the second Brown opinion, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the goal of
segregationists would have been maintained in spite of the result in Brown I.
86. An example of this type of legislation can be found in the Education Amendments of
1974 which established a priority of remedies to be used by federal courts and agencies in imple-
menting desegregation. 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-46 (1976).
87. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1976).
11
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accurate to state that without the "one man-one vote" decisions, the
newly enfranchised black electorate would have found it extremely dif-
ficult to avoid being gerrymandered out of effective participation in the
political process. Even in those geographical areas where blacks now
constitute a significant portion of the electorate, without Baker and
Reynolds it would be possible to vastly dilute their vote through malap-
portionment. In White v. Register," a case arising in my own state of
Texas, the Supreme Court relied on Reynolds v. Sims,89 Whitcomb v.
Chavis,90 and others, to frustrate the last efforts of that state to dilute
the vote of minorities. The Court decreed that multi-member legisla-
tive districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties could not be justified on the
basis of any state interest.9'
CONCLUSION
Earl Warren was a man for the season, a supremely confident prag-
matist who was able to transcend the politically expedient decisions of
his past and able to unite a divided court. He viewed the role of the
Court not as an applier of narrowly drawn legalistic decisions, but as a
dispenser of just solutions within the broad perameters of the Constitu-
tion.
88. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
89. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
90. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
91. 412 U.S. at 769.
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